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"Whatever our views about desirable behavior . .. they can never legitimately be applied
to the situation of a single country which is part of an international economic system, and
any attempt to do so is likely in the long-run and for the world as a whole to be an addi-
tional source ofinstability."
F. A. Hayek, 1937.
One of the more painful lessons that econo-
mists, businessmen and policymakers learned in
the first half of the 1970's was that their domes-
tic economic environment is influenced not only
by stabilization policy at home, but also by de-
velopments in other countries. Inflation in the
U.S. in the 1973-74 period was higher because
inflation was a worldwide phenomenon. The
recession in 1974-75 was more serious because
it was a worldwide phenomenon. In short, the
synchronous development ofinflation and reces-
sion has made the U.S. economy more unstable
than it was in the 1950's and 1960's.
The purpose of this article is to explain how
stabilization policies in the rest of the world
could impact on the U.S. economy to frustrate
domestic stabilization goals. According to one
interpretation, "supply shocks" associated with
the oil price rise, agricultural shortfalls, and
other natural calamities have contributed to the
inflation, but this is only a partial explanation.
Rather, expansionary stabilization policies in
the rest of the world were a major source of
the acceleration in U.S. inflation in 1973-74,
and expansionary policies abroadin the last year
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and a half could set the stage for some reacceler-
ation of U.S. inflation in 1977.
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In Section I, we develop a simple model
which provides a consistent explanation of how
expansionary stabilization policies in the rest of
the world can lead to higher domestic inflation
and lower domestic real output growth than
would be warranted by domestic policy alone.
In Section II, we present empirical evidence in
support of this model. In Section III, we evalu-
ate the potential impact of recent world and
domestic monetary policies on U.S. inflation in
1977 and beyond, and in a concluding section
consider the implications of this analysis for
making national stabilization policies in a world
environment. A technical appendix provides a
mathematical exposition of the model and its
application to the U.K. and Germany.
The term "stabilization policy" refers here to
traditional monetary and fiscal policy tools of
aggregate demand management. In both the
theoretical and empirical sections of this article,
monetary policy will be given the primary con-
sideration. This focus does not imply that fiscal
policy is an inferior policy tool. However, over
the historical period considered here, monetary
poliey has shown the greater variance and hence
its impact on aggregate demand is more amen-
able to empirical testing.I. The Basic Model
We can model the impact of world and do-
mestic stabilization policies on short-run domes-
tic equilibrium by drawing together elements of
a monetary analysis of world inflation and a
Keynesian analysis of national-income deter-
mination. Specifically, the model is based on
the following relationships:
I. Domestic nominal aggregate demand is
determined by domestic monetary and fiscal
policy.according to the standard Keynesian
LM/IS analysis. Given constant stocks of cap-
ital and labor, and a constant level of technol-
ogy, real aggregate supply is determined by the
price level and the nominal wage rate. Internal
balance is achieved when aggregate demand is
equal to aggregate supply. Abstracting from
capital flows, external balance is defined as the
equality of exports and imports. Thus the equi-
librium conditions for internal and external bal-
ance are identical.
2. Each country faces an elastic world de-
mand for the internationally traded goods it
produces, with the price level determined by the
aggregate of world monetary policies." We
assume that no single country has a significant
impact on the world demand for internationally
traded goods. Furthermore, each country is
assumed to have effective control over its do-
mestic money stock, both under fixed and flexi-
ble exchange rates."
3. By the "law of one price," the domestic
price of internationally traded goods is jointly
determined by world prices in foreign currency
and the exchange rate between domestic and
foreign currencies.
4. Money wages are rigid downwards but ad-
just upwards with a rise in the domestic price
level. Hence, if exchange rates are "sticky" in
the short run, for reasons to be explored below,
world price inflation will be translated into do-
mestic price inflation and then into domestic
wage inflation.
According to this model, if a number of major
countries uniformly follow expansionary mone-
tary polices, the result will be increased demand
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for internationally traded goods, and a rise in
the world price of traded goods. In the absence
of exchange - rate adjustment, traded - goods
prices will rise even in the country which has not
participated in the expansionary policy.
Why, under flexible exchange rates, doesn't
exchange-rate appreciation offset the world
price rise? The simplest explanation is that
world inflation will increase import and export
prices proportionately, and hence will have no
initial substitution (terms of trade) effect.' With
no substitution effect, only the income effect will
operate on the exchange rate. The higher do-
mestic price level will reduce the real money
stock, inducing a decline in real aggregate de-
mand for goods, including imports. The ex-
change rate will appreciate in response to the
resulting trade surplus. Only at this point will
the movement in the exchange rate operate to
offset the impact of the rise in world prices on
domestic prices. While this income effect is
powerful, most studies suggest that it requires
a year or more to unfold. In addition, it oper-
ates only after the higher world price is passed
through to higher domestic prices.
If nothing else happened, the unusual rise in
domestic prices would be temporary. A trade
surplus would eventually emerge, and the ex-
change rate would appreciate to reduce the do-
mestic relative price of traded goods to non-
traded goods. However, this result will not
occur if there is an induced increase in money
wages during the period when domestic prices
are higher. Higher money wages will shift the
aggregate supply curve upward, in the sense
that for each level of output, the unit cost of
production or supply price will be higher. The
resulting equilibrium of aggregate demand and
supply will be at a lower level of real output
and a higher level of prices than would be ex-
pected from domestic monetary policy alone.
In this case the relative price of traded and non-
traded goods is reestablished by a rise in non-
traded goods prices.
Thus expansionary policies in the rest of the
world-' can lead to hoth a higher inflation rateand a higher unemployment rate in the U.S.
than would have otherwise occurred. By the
same token, when other countries stop follow-
ing expansionary policies, the U.S. inflation rate
will decline to a level consistent with strictly
domestic demand and supply considerations.
The deceleration of traded-goods prices will re-
duce domestic inflation. Then, with a given
aggregate demand, real income will rise, leading
to an increase in real demand for output and a
decline in unemployment.
This explanation of the interaction between
world and domestic stabilization policies helps
to reconcile a number of apparently conflicting
explanations of the currentinflation. Itprovides
a method to link the traditional aggregate-de-
mand analysis with both world-monetary and
cost-push explanations of inflation, along the
following lines.
(1) Domestic monetary and fiscal policies
explain shifts in nominal aggregate demand if
there is a stable relationship between nominal
monetary and fiscal policies and nominal in-
come. However, the split between prices and
output cannot be explained by aggregate-de-
mand analysis alone, but must also take into
account the shifts in aggregate supply.
(2) The rest of the world's monetary policies
can explain the process whereby inflation in
internationally traded goods directly (if tem-
porarily) adds to domestic inflation, and thus
can explain how the Phillips curve, which re-
lates inflation to output (or unemployment),
can break down under certain circumstances.
(3) The response of domestic wages to do-
mestic inflationary pressures (which can be
viewed as a cost-push element) determines the
extent to which world inflation is permanently
or only temporarily translated into domestic
inflation.
Four empirical propositions underlie this
analysis.
1. The aggregate of stabilization (largely
monetary) policies of the majorindustrial coun-
tries determines the prices of internationally
tradedgoods.
2. The domestic price index (which is a
weighted average of traded and non-traded
goods prices) responds to both domestic and
world monetary-policy actions.
3. The permanency of the impact of world
prices on domestic prices depends upon the
wage response to increases in domestic prices.
4. Domestic monetary and fiscal policies de-
termine domestic aggregate demand but not the
split between prices and output.
We shall now proceed to investigate the
validity of each of these propositions.
II. Testingthe Model
Standard regression techniques were used to
estimate the functional relationships implied by
the propositions developed in Section I. The
source for all raw data, except where otherwise
noted, was International Financial Statistics
published by the International Monetary Fund.
The data covered the period 1960.2 through
1975.3, which included a period of fixed ex-
change rates until 1973.1 and largely floating
rates thereafter.
All equations were estimated in quarterly
percentage-change format. This should be kept
in mind in evaluating the quality of the statistical
results. With this type of computation, the per-
cent of explained variance (R") will be in the
40-to-80 percent range rather than the 90-to-99
7
percent range common to equations estimated
in level form. By using change rather than level
data, we omit the variance to be explained by
trend (thus reducing R2), leaving only the
cyclical and random component. Actually the
random component is magnified, because the
change data add the random element in the two
adjacent level observations. As the equation is
not expected to explain random movement, this
further reduces the R 2
• The superior measure
of "good fit" in this case is the standard error
(SE) which has the same meaning in both level
and change form.
World Inflation and World Money
Our key hypothesis states that the price levelof internationally traded goods is a positive
function of the nominal world money supply,
which serves as a summary measure of the
world's monetary stabilization policies. To test
our hypothesis, we regress percentage changes
in world prices on percentage changes in nom-
inal world money.
The world price level is defined empirically
to be the index of export prices of industrial
countries expressed in U.S. dollars. There are
several reasons for this definition. Since indus-
trial countries predominate in world trade, they
collectively determine the price level of interna-
tionally traded goods and therefore the world
inflation rate. Secondly, data for industrial
countries are the most complete and most re-
liable data available. Finally, a definition in
terms of U.S. dollars removes the need to intro-
duce the exchange rate explicitly into the em-
pirical analysis, although the measure of world
prices will obviously be influenced by exchange-
rate movements.
The world money supply is defined to be the
weighted average of the money supplies of ten
major industrial countries. The money supply
of each individual country is defined in terms of
MI , currency in circulation plus demand de-
posits. To convert different M 1 values into a
common denominator, quarter-to-quarter rates
of change are computed and a weighted sum of
the changes calculated for each quarter. The
weights represent each country's proportionate
share in 1975 of the total trade of industrial
countries.
G These weights are adopted because,
in view of the distinction between traded and
non-traded goods, the impact of domestic de-
mand-management policies on world prices will
depend on the extent to which the country en-
gages in trade.
A second-degree polynominal distributed-
lag equation was estimated, linking quarterly
percentage changes of world prices with quar-
terly percentage changes of world money sup-
ply. World money supply was lagged over 12









~ Log Pw 'c~c Percent change in international traded goods
prices, measured by export prices of indus-
trial countries.
~ Log Mw Percent change in world money supply, mea-
sured by weighted average percent change of
!vh in 10 industrial countries.
The Durbin-Watson statistic indicates the
presence of serial correlation, which suggests
that an important explanatory variable may
have been omitted from the estimation. Wc
hypothesized that world prices would depend
positively on nominal world money supply and
negatively on real world income or output, but
we do not have a suitable proxy for the lattcr
variable.
In view of the unusually large quarterly varia-
tion in our measure of international prices, thc
predicted value of world prices differed substan-
tially from the actual value on a quarter-to-
quarter basis. For the period from 1973.3 to
1974.3, for example, errors ranged from a high
of 32 percent to a low of 4 percent.
Actual Predicted
Period Value Value Error
1973.3 41 27 14
1973.4 6 26 +20
1974.1 17 24 + 7
1974.2 52 20 -32
1974.3 14 18 + 4
Average 26 23 3
However, the average rate of increase in inter-
national prices over this period was 26 percent,
and the equation performed reasonably well by
predicting an inflation rate which averaged 23
percent over the period. Thus, the average
error for the total of the five quarters was only
3 percent-less than any quarter-to-quarter
error because of the tendency of quarterly
errors to offset each other.'
Our estimation indicates that a one-percent
increase in world money-supply growth will,
over a period of about three years, add 31/lpercent to world price inflation, or an average
of just under one percent a year. The very
high negative constant term implies that a
world money-supply growth rate of approxi-
mately 7Y2 percent is necessary to achieve
rough world price stability (27.1/3.59 ~= 7.5). A
world money-supply growth rate less than 7Y2
percent would lead to world price deflation.
This agrees with what we observe empirically.
Between 1960 and 1970 world
averaged between 7 and 8 percent, and during
this period world prices remained relatively
stable (Charts 2 and 3).
National Income and Domestic Monetary-
Fiscal Policies
The model presented in Section I assumed
that domestic aggregate demand, measured by
nominal national income, is positively related
to domestic nominal money supply and nom-
inal government expenditure. If the nominal
aggregate demand function is linear homo-
geneous, then aggregate demand in real terms,
measured by real income, would be positively
related to the real money stock and real gov-
ernment expenditures. We test these two rela-
tionships by estimating percentage changes in
nominal (real) income as a second degree
polynominal distributed lag of nominal (real)
money stock and government expenditure. In
each estimation, explanatory variables are
lagged over four quarters.
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'" Log Y = percent change in nominal income, measured
by GNP in current dollars
'" Log M percent change in money supply, measured by
Ml
!l Log G percent change in government expenditures in
current dollars
An asterisk (") indicates a real variable, defined by divid-
ing the nominal variable by the GNP price deflator.
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When the equation is estimated in nominal
form, the sum of coefficients on nominal money
supply is statistically significant. The sum of
coefficients on government expenditure has the
right sign but its t-statistic is insignificant; how-
ever, the inclusion of this variable improves the
overall fit of the equation. Only 34 percent of
the observed variance of nominal income is ex-
plained by the equation. However, as income
is measured on a quarter-to-quarter basis, the
"random element" is magnified relative to the
cyclical element, thus reducing the amount of
total variance which the independent variables
are expected to explain. The relatively low
standard error (around three percent) indi-
cates that the fit is reasonably good, and the
fact that the Durbin-Watson statistic is close to
two in value suggests that all the systematic
movement in income has been accounted for.
When the eCluation is estimated in the real
form, the coetficients remain approximately the
same (supporting the hypothesis of homogen-
eity) but their statistical significance increases.
The equation explains 60 percent of the vari-
ance in real aggregate demand, and the stand-
ard error of the estimates is slightly lower than
in the nominal version. Dividing the equation
through by a common price index which ex-
hibits a large systematic variation increases the
percentage of total variance which is systematic
and reduces the percentage which is random.
The fit of the equation improves as a result.
Our estimates indicate that income is ap-
proximately proportional to the money supply.
That is, a one-percent increase in money supply
leads to about a one-percent increase in aggre-
gate demand. The factor of proportionality
(income velocity) is approximately 2.5 whether
the equation is estimated in real or in nominal
form. Moreover, the relatively short lag with
which changes in money-supply growth influ-
ence the growth of aggregate demand, indicates
that the demand side of the economy adjusts
very quickly, i.e. the economy moves along the
aggregate-demand curve rather than off it.
The assumption of unit elasticity for the
aggregate-demand curve implies that nominalChart 1
same results. Only the latter version is re-
portedbelow (Chart 1).
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t
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12 (3.9) (5.8) (7.4)
+ L 0.16 Hog PWt _4 (5.3)
R 2/SE .87/1.11
OW/DE 1.66/41
The equation explains 87 percent of the vari-
ance in the U.S. inflation rate. For every one-
percent increase in the U.S. money stock (M!)
over the current and twelve past quarters, the
U.S. inflation rate (CPl) will increase by 1.5
percent. For everyone-percent increase in in-
ternational inflation over the past four quarters,
the U.S. inflation rate will increase by .16 per-
cent. This lag reflects the time delay that is
typically observed between changes in whole-
sale prices (by which international prices are
measured) and changes in retail prices (by
which domestic prices are measured).
A dummy variable (DUM) was added to
the equation to account for Phases I and II of
the price-control period (August 15, 1971 to
December 1972). Our estimate suggests that,
as a result of controls, the annual U.S. inflation
rate was 3.3 percent lower over the 5lh-quarter
period than would otherwise have been the
case. Removal of controls probably pushed up
income will be constant at any point along a
given demand curve. In other words, nominal
income cannot change unless there is an under-
lying shift in the demand curve. Thus we may
interpret our estimation of aggregate demand in
nominal form as a measure of the shift in the
aggregate-demand curve resulting from changes
in domestic monetary-fiscal policies. By the
same token, we interpret our estimation of the
aggregate-demand equation in real form as a
measurement of movements along the demand
curve resulting from a change in the real money
stock, with the nominal money stock held con-
stant. To put it another way, an increase in the
price level will decrease real money supply, in-
ducing a decrease in aggregate demand for real
goods, i.e., a movement along the demand
curve. This interpretation, which is consistent
with the evidence, allows us to distinguish shifts
in the aggregate demand curve from move-
ments along the curve. This will prove helpful
in Section III, because it will allow us to side-
step the assumption of a stable Phillips curve
in analyzing the trade-off between inflation and
unemployment.
World and Domestic Monetary Policies and the
Domestic Price level
In Section I, we argued that the domestic
price level could be influenced by monetary
policy in the rest of the world as well as by
domestic stabilization policies. Two alternative
reduced-form tests can be applied to confirm
this proposition. The common independent
variable in each of these tests is the domestic
money stock. This variable measures the im-
pact of domestic stabilization action, and its
inclusion is based on the proposition that infla-
tion is in the long run a monetary phenomenon.
The other influence on domestic inflation (as
postulated in Section I) is world money growth,
operating through the prices of internationally
traded goods. This influence can be estimated
either by adding world money directly as an
independent variable affecting domestic prices,
orby adding internationally traded goods prices
to the domestic price equation. Both ap-
proaches were tested and gave roughly the
10the U.S. inflation rate in following periods, but
this is not incorporated in our equation because
of timing problems. The adjustment did not
necessarily have to occur immediately after the
end of Phase H controls. Phase HI lasted
through 1973, and market conditions may have
caused the adjustment to extend over an even
longer period. The error pattern in the esti-
mated equation (as shown in Chart 1) suggests
that much of the adjustment occurred in 1974.
This equation was also estimated for the
wholesale price index. The results are summar-
ized below.
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2
+7. 416 LogPwt _2 '(4.8)
.63/4.15
1.88/43
The results differ from those in the CPI equa-
tion in ways one would expect. The time lag
between changes in the money stock and world
prices and changes in the WPI are shorter, re-
flecting the fact that wholesale prices tend to
move earlier in the cycle than do retail prices.
The coefficient in world prices was much larger
(.41 vs. .16) because the weight of interna-
tionally traded goods is much larger in the WPI
than in the CPI.
Effect of Prices on Wages
In Section 1 and more explicitly in Appendix
I, the responsiveness of exchange rates to dif-
ferential (U.S. and world) inflation rates is re-
lated to the speed and completeness of the re-
sponse of nominal wages to changes in prices.
If this adjustment occurs quickly and com-
pletely-i.e. if the short run wage-price elas-
ticity is unity-then the higher domestic prices
induced by higher international prices will be
permanent. The higher supply price of output
will prevent an export surplus from developing
and will frustrate any exchange-rate apprecia-
tion. Without such appreciation, there will be
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no offset to world inflation and the higher do-
mestic prices will be permanent.
A very simple test was conducted to measure
the influence of prices on wages, the former
being measured by the CPI and the latter by an
hourly-earnings index. If wages rise at the
average rate of productivity plus some propor-
tion of the rate of domestic inflation-and if we
assume, as a first approximation, that average
productivity growth is constant-then we can
relate a distributed lag of past price changes to
current wage changes. The number of lag quar-
ters required for the coefficient relating prices
to wages to approximate unity is crucial. The
shorter the lag, the larger and more permanent
will be the effect of world prices on domestic
prices. The results for the U.S. are given below.
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After 12 quarters (3 years), 90 percent of the
original past inflation is reflected in U.S. wages.
Longer lags do not increase the size of the co-
efficient. About 60 percent of the impact is
achieved in the first year, and 80 percent by
the end of the second year.
The critical period for the impact of domes-
tic inflation on domestic wages is one year be-
cause, as discussed above, this is the length of
the period over which aggregate-demand ad-
justment takes place. Over a longer period, in-
come effects can create an export surplus, thus
causing the exchange rate to appreciate and to
offset the effects ofworld inflation. The share of
internationally traded goods in the CPI market
basket is approximately 25 percent-60 percent
of which is .I5, a number very close to the.I6
coefficient on world prices in our estimated
equation explaining domestic inflation. Simi-
larly, 60 percent of the share of internationally
traded goods prices in the WPI is .30, which is
somewhat smaller than the estimated coefficient
of.41.
Summary of Empirical Findings
(1) World money supply, as a summary
measure of world monetary stabilization poli-cies, is an important factor explaining the price
of internationally traded goods. Our estimates
indicate that over a period of three years every
one-percent increase in world money supply
growth in excess of 7.5 percent will add 31 /2
percent to international inflation. This magni-
fied effect of world money supply on world
prices provides support to the hypothesis that a
simultaneous expansion of aggregate demand
by industrial countries, resulting from synchro-
nized money expansion, leads to a more than
proportional increase in world prices. The im-
plications of the hypothesis are explored in
Section III.
(2) Domestic monetary and fiscal policy is
an important determinant of domestic aggre-
gate demand, with a relatively short lag of
about one year. An increase in domestic money
supply growth will increase domestic aggregate
demand proportionately. On the other hand.,
changes in the real money stock will induce a
movement along a given aggregate demand
schedule of unit elasticity. An increase in
prices, from whatever source, will decrease the
real money stock and lead to a proportional
reduction in the demand for real output after
about one year.
(3) Both domestic money supply and world
inflation exert significant influences on the do-
mestic rate of inflation, although the impor-
tance of domestic monetary policy is propor-
tionately larger. A one - percent increase in
world inflation will, over a period of one year,
add a .16-percent increase to the domestic CPI
and .41 percent to the domestic WPI. In con-
trast, a one-percent domestic monetary expan-
sion will, over a period of two years, add 1.5
percent to the domestic CPI and 2.0 percent to
the WPI.
(4) Wages will respond to domestic infla-
tion over a relatively long three-year period.
However, in the critical first year-when it in-
fluences the extent of the impact of world infla-
tion on domestic inflation-about 60 percent
of the higher CPI will be reflected in higher
wages.
III. Implications forthe Future
The previous discussion suggests that expan-
sionary monetary policies in the rest of the
world can have perverse effects on a domestic
economy. When one country acts in relative
isolation to control domestic aggregate de-
mand, it can, at least in the intermediate period
of a business cycle, trade along the Phillips
curve and gain an increase in output at the ex-
pense of an increase in the inflation rate. How-
ever, when many countries are operating in
concert (whether by design or accident), the
net effect on a domestic economy could be a
higher inflation rate with little or no favorable
impact on output or employment.
During the 1950's and 60's, industrial coun-
tries largely conducted their stabilization poli-
cies in isolation from others, reflecting their
lack of synchronization of policies. Typically,
when one country was in an easy-money phase,
other countries were in a tight-money phase of
the cycle. The net effect was relative stability
in the growth of world aggregate c1emand.
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The environment of the early 1970's was
different. Most major industrial countries fol-
lowed tight and easy monetary polices in a
uniform pattern. This increased synchroniza-
tion of monetary policy is illustrated in Chart
I, which shows the weighted-average money
growth rate of 10 major industrial countries
over the 1955-76 period. In the period through
1970, the world money stock grew at a rela-
tively stable rate in the 7-8 percent range.
While in individual countries money growth
showed strong cyclical patterns-because they
were in different phases of the cycle-the aver-
age money growth was relatively stable. Only
in the 1970's was this pattern of stability
broken. From 1971 through early 1973, world
money stock accelerated to a 13-percent growth
rate, but then it decelerated in 1973-74 to a
9-percent rate. Finally, in 1975 through mid-
1976, it reaccelerated to approximately a 12-
percent growth rate. This instability resulted
from the synchronized pattern of monetary ex-40
pansion of industrial countries during the
1970's.
Why Synchronized Monetary Cycles?
The acceleration in world money growth in
the 1970-75 period was associated with the
breakdown of the Bretton Woods fixed ex-
change-rate system." Previously, countries oth-
er than the U.S. maintained the international
value of their national currencies at a fixed rate
by buying and selling dollars in the foreign-
exchange market. This policy worked well for
most countries in the period through the mid-
1960's. But then the U.S. inflation rate acceler-
ated, and the resulting balance-of-payments def-
icit increased the supply of dollars to the rest
of the world relative to demand. The problem
came to a head in August 1971, when the U.S.
suspended convertibility of the dollar into gold
for foreign central banks. While this event led
to an exchange-rate adjustment (the so-called
Smithsonian agreement in December 1971),
most central banks still attempted to maintain
fixed values of their national currency in terms
of dollars. However, this policy required buy-
ing an increasingly large amount of dollar
assets in response to the widespread attempts
by private citizens (both here and abroad) to
shift their portfolios out of dollars-first into
the stronger currencies like the German mark
and Japanese yen, and eventually into the cur-
rencies of almost all other industrial countries.
The international reserves of industrial coun-
tries grew at a relatively stable 7-percent rate
from 1958 to 1970, butfrom that point to early
1973, as foreign central banks monetized dollar
inflows, they expanded their holdin&s both of
international reserves and of domestic money
(Chart 2). Yet when most central banks col-
lectively abandoned the fixed-rate regime in
March 1973, there was an abrupt deceleration
in the growth of international-reserve holdings.
Within a short time, central banks returned the
growth rates of their domestic money stocks to
more normal levels. However, just as the
acceleration in money led to a worldwide busi-
ness cycle boom and inflation, so deceleration
in money led to a worldwide business recession
and a rise in unemployment to the highest levels
since the 1930's.
Central banks have usually responded in the
past to high unemployment rates by following
an easy monetary policy, especially when there
were no balance-of-payments constraints to in-
terfere with that goal.
HJ The same was true in
1975-76, as most countries reacted to high un-
employment with a simultaneous domestic
monetary expansion which then brought about
another expansion in the world money stock.
Consequences of aSynchronized Cycle
This instability in the average growth of
world money was accompanied, with an aver-
age lag of about eight quarters, by greater in-
stability in the prices of internationally traded
goods. This relationship is seen in Chart 3.
The broad - gauge measure of international
prices was relatively stable in the 1950's and
'60's, accelerated sharply in late 1972 and early
20
30













Source: Materials Price: The Economist commodity price ($) index.














(Assume U.S. MJ = 5 percent)
World MJ = 8% World M, = 12%
CPI WPI CPI WPI
reason is that the current rise in materials prices
was preceded by a rise in the world money
stock, as was the case in 1972, but not in 1968.
If the lags between world money and interna-
tional prices are stable, we would expect that a
rise in prices of internationally traded goods
will occur in 1977.
The duration of the rise in international
prices depends upon the future growth in the
world money stock. Given the lags in the sys-
tem, however, a 10- to 14-percent rate of in-
ternational price inflation in 1977 seems to be
already determined by past monetary policies.
This is in contrast with the negative rate of
inflation in 1976 and the 26-percent inflation
rate in 1974.
What do these international price develop-
ments imply for U.S. inflation in 1977? The
model suggests that-contrary to general eco-
nomic opinion-flexible exchange rates may
not completely isolate a country from interna-
tional inflation. The size of the inflation will
depend upon the extent of the rise in interna-
tionally traded goods prices and upon the share
of such goods in the domestic price index. On
the basis of the estimates of Section II, the
Wholesale Price Index (WPI) would rise 7 to
8 percent in 1977 versus a 4-percent annual
rate in the first nine months of 1976. The Con-
sumer Price Index (CPI) would rise 6 to 7
percent in 1977 versus a 51;2 percent annual
rate in the first nine months of 1976.
Compared to the 1973-74 experience, the
impact of international inflation on U.S. infla-
tion is expected to be relatively modest in 1977.
However, the impact would be large by the
standards of the 1950's and '60's, and could
increase in later years. The table below sum-
marizes the impact on U.S. prices of alternative
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1973, decelerated sharply in 1975, and con-
tinued low in the first half of 1976.
World Materials
and General Industrial Prices
Meanwhile, sensitive materials prices tended
to move ahead of the general body of interna-
tional prices. Materials prices generally move
in a more dramatic fashion than the prices of
other goods, reflecting the relatively inelastic
short-run demand and supply for such goods.
This greater price variance can, at times, give
misleading signals as to the future course of
other international prices. For example, sensi-
tive materials prices increased 15 percent be-
tween late 1968 and late 1969, but were not
followed by an equally substantial rise in other
international prices. Eventually, the materials
price increase was reversed. However, in 1972
this index provided a reliable leading indicator
of a rise in the broader index of international
prices-and in 1974 it foreshadowed the de-
cline in general international prices. In each
case the lead was about one year.
The current rise in materials prices raises the
question of whether it is a prelude to another
bout of international inflation or a random
gyration soon to be reversed. The model de-
veloped here suggests that international infla-
tion will, in fact, accelerate again in 1977. The
14On the assumptions of a 5-percent growth
in domestic M, and an 8-percent growth in
world M 1 (the average of the 1960's) world
prices would be stable and the U.S. inflation
rate would be dominated by strictly domestic
considerations. By the end of the decade, the
CPI would rise at about a 4-percent rate and
the WPI at about a 3-percent rateY If world
M 1 growth continues at 12 percent, then the
longer-term trend in the u.s. CPI will be in the
6- to 6h -percent range and the WPI in the
8 Vz - to 9-percent range.'2
Conclusion
What implications can policymakers derive
from this analysis? One possible implication
is that policymakers should respond to im-
ported inflation by expanding domestic aggre-
gate demand sufficiently so that the higher
prices will not induce a fall in real output. Even
if a country cannot control its domestic infla-
tion rate, it can at least control its domestic
unemployment rate with appropriately stimula-
tive stabilization policy.
This policy inference, however, is incom-
plete and therefore misleading. While it may
be desirable for anyone country to follow do-
mestic stabilization policies to offset the effects
of imported inflation, if all countries followed
such a policy simultaneously the result would
be explosive inflation. The expansion in world
money supply would lead to an even larger
world business-cycle expansion and pressures
on internationally traded goods prices-and
therefore to higher rates of imported inflation.
To avoid the unemployment consequences pre-
dicted by the Phillips curve would require even
further monetary ease, which on the aggregate
of all countries would further aggravate the in-
flation rate.
In this context we have a "game theory"
solution. If anyone country took action in
isolation it could achieve an unambiguous im-
provement in its situation by following an easy
monetary policy. However, if all countries en-
gaged in that practice, all would be worse off
than before, in the sense that they would ex-
perience a higher rate of inflation with the same
rate of unemployment. Thus, the optimal sta-
bilization strategy in this world context would
be for all governments to agree to follow mod-
erate monetary policies. While this course
would prevent any country which acts alone
from improving its unemployment rate as fast
as might otherwise be the case, the world as a
whole would experience a deceleration in infla-
tion with a given unemployment rate.
This clearly suggests that in an interdepen-
dent world, with its close ties in real and finan-
cial markets, the degree of monetary indepen-
dence expected under flexible exchange rates
has been circumscribed in a significant way.
This provides a rationale for increased inter-
national cooperation, along the lines attempted
at the economic summit conferences in Puerto
Rico in June of this year and at Rambouillet
in November 1975.
FOOTNOTES
1. This argument was presented by one of th('l authors in
another context in the Spring 1975 issue of the Review.
See M. W. Keran "Toward an Explanation of Simultaneous
Inflation-Recession_"
2. This relationship may be derived from the monetary
theory of the balance of payments, which states that world
prices are determined by the stock equilibrium condition
of equality between world demand and supply of money
balances. The excess of the growth rate of nominal world
money supply over the growth rate of real world money
demand determines the world rate of inflation. H. J.
Johnson, "The Monetary Approach to Balance-of-Payments
Theory," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis.
March 1972. J. A. Frenkel and H. G. Johnson, eds., The
Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments, University
of Toronto Press, 1976, and R. Dornbusch, "The Theory of
Flexible Exchange Rate Regimes and Macroeconomic Pol-
iCY," Scandinavian Journal of Economics (forthcoming).
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3. This assumption contrasts with that of the monetary
theory of the balance of payments. It may be justified as
follows: In a world of flexible exchange rates, monetary
independence is achieved automatically through the ab-
sence of central-bank intervention in the foreign-exchange
market. In a world of fixed exchange rates, this is achieved
by central banks imposing capital market controls to such
an extent that domestic and foreign financial markets are
independent of each other over the relevant period of
analysis, i.e. the business cycle. It may be argued that the
experience of the early 1970's makes this assumption
unrealistic. However, we would argue that when loss of
domestic monetary control became a significant problem,
central banks took actions to retain their monetary inde-
pendence by moving to a flexible-exchange rate regime in
March 1973.
4. An alternative explanation is that real net exports do
increase, but that this is offset by a disproportionatechange in import and export prices. The latter explanation
is perhaps more realistic in the case of those developed
countries which import raw materials and export finished
products. Since raw materials have a relatively less elastic
short-run supply response to changes in demand than do
finished products, raw-material prices will rise before fin-
ished-product prices. The temporary adverse shift in the
terms of trade could offset the real export surplus and
leave the nominal trade balance temporarily unchanged.
5. More precisely, in the case being considered, world
stabilization policies lead to an expansion of world aggre-
gate demand which exceeds the expansion of domestic
aggregate demand. This is the most relevant case in terms
ofihe U.S. in the 1970's. For formal analysis of this, as
well as of the reverse case, see Appendix I.
6. The countries and their respective weights are: Belgium
(.060), Canada (.071), France (.108), Germany (.166),
Italy (.074), Japan (.115), Netherlands (.071), Switzerland
(.027), United Kingdom (.099), United States (.213). The
weights do not sum to one due to rounding. The weights
are derived from export and import trade shares in 1975.
7. These observations represent an extreme example of a
fairly common phenomenon in estimating "change" equa-
tions where the random element is large. These equations
are more successful in forecasting the average value of
the dependent variable than in forecasting the individual
quarters.
8.• An F-test indicates that the improved fit gained from
the inclusion of this variable is significant at the .05 level.
9. See M. Keran, "An Appropriate International Currency:
Gold, Dollars, or SDR?," Federal Reserve Bank of St. louis,
Review, August 1972 (Reprint 78), and D. I. Meiselman,
"WOrldwide Inflation: A Monetarist View," The Phenomenon
ot Worldwide Intlation, American Enterprise Institute, 1975.
10. Balance-ot-payments constraints were eased in late
1974 tor two reasons: (1) most industrial nations had an
historically high level of international reserves at that time,
and (2) flexible exchange rates were seen as a device to
avoid traditional balance-ot-payments consequences of easy
money.
11. The differential reflects the lower productivity growth
in the service industries (which have a larger weight in the
CPI) than in the goods industries (which have a higher
weight in the wpn.
12. The differential is due to the CPl's lower international-
trade component, which more than offsets the lower pro-
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specification implies that the elasticity of the ag-
gregate demand curve is unity. Equation (4) ex-
presses aggregate supply as a function of the price
level relative to the nominal wage. This particular
specification is based on the assumptions of an
aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function and
profit maximization by competitive firms. Equa-
tion (5) is implied by an assumption of flexible
exchange rates. Abstracting from capital flows
and central bank interventions, net exports must
be zero, in which case domestic aggregate demand
and supply are equal." Finally, Equation (6)
states that wages are flexible upward, rising with
prices, but rigid downwards. The term 00 may be
thought of as the initial wage level. As a result of
downward wage rigidity, the labor market does
not necessarily clear and output may vary over the
short run.
Upon differentiating, substituting, and rearrang-
ing, we arrive at the following relationships (lower
case letters are logarithmic differentials):
0' 0:::>0
P EPw
So 11 B > 0 ·0
Q (p y Yo' y>o Yo /W)
PQ = Y
This appendix formalizes the model presented
in Section 1. Since this paper concentrates on
monetary variables, the model is simplified by
assuming that both domestic nominal government
expenditure and real world income are constant.
To further facilitate exposition, it is assumed that
all goods are internationally traded, although this
assumption does not alter qualitative results.
The model is summarized by a system of six
equations in six unknowns:
Pw ao i1w
(6)
"Under fixed exchange rates or a managed float, (5) is
replaced by
where R is a reserve flow (a policy parameter). SiI:ce
positive net exports add directly to income, equation (3)
then becomes
n = J..-. ('!l- + w)
(7) l+y y
q = (m - w) (8)
e = p - Pw (9)
(5')
(3') (PQ-,!) "
prJ - Y R
y"
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IA = 11AX {olo, 0o} 00>0, 0::'0::.1
where Mw and M are exogenous world and do-
mestic money supplies, respectively, Pw and Pare
world and domestic price levels, E is the exchange
rate in domestic currency, Y is domestic nominal
income, Q is real domestic output, and W is the
nominal wage.
Equation (1) expresses the world price level as
a positive function of world money supply. In
Equation (2) world and domestic price levels are
linked by the exchange rate due to goods arbi-
trage. Equation (3) states that nominal income is
determined by domestic monetary policy. ThisSubstituting (11') into (7) and (8), and solving
yields for m > 0:
Domestic Monetary Expansion
Since domestic monetary expansion places up-
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l+y w q
P , -Y- ( ~ + ocrm) > 0
l+y y w
e ' p - Pw '
_ om
vi - t1AX (o~mw' T+YrJ=6T} , for rilw' m,:-o ( 16)
equations (7) - (II) were solved simultaneously
for all endogenous variables, the solution would
be exactly the same as the case of a simple domes-
tic monetary expansion, except that the exchange
rate would depreciate less or possibly even appreci-
ate due to world price inflation.
If, on the other hand, endogenous variables ad-
just at differeDt speeds to shocks to the system,
then these conclusions could be altered. In par-
ticular, suppose that wages and prices adjust
quickly relative to the exchange rate. '" Then world
price inflation would have no initial impact on the
exchange rate, but would be translated into pro-
portionately higher domestic prices through (2)
and then higher wages through (6). The initial
domestic price inflation is a disequilibrium phen-
omenon and will eventually be partially offset by
exchange-rate appreciation as the real sector be-
gins to adjust to the price rise. Wages, however,
will remain permanently higher because of the
assumption of downward rigidity.
The extent of wage inflation in the economy will
therefore depend on the interaction of world and
domestic monetary ·policies. If world price infla-
tion exceeds the domestic inflation rate warranted
by domestic monetary policy, then wage inflation
will be proportional to world price inflation. If,
on the other hand, the world inflation rate is less
than or equal to that warranted by domestic pol-
icy, then wage inflation will be proportional to
domestic price inflation. World price inflation is
given by equation (10), while domestic inflation
warranted by domestic monetary policy is given
by equation (12). The appropriate wage adjust-
ment equation for a simultaneous domestic and
world monetary expansion is therefore
"For an explanation of why the exchange rate might he
sticky, see Section 1, p. 4.
Let 8 = l/(~+~y(l-o»).. In the case where mw:'0m
world inflation is less than or equal to that war-
ranted bydomestic policy-equilibrium is defined
by equations (12), (13), and (14'). The more
interesting case is where m\/ 8m world infla-
tion exceeds that warranted by domestic policy.
Then combining (7)-(10) and (16) yields for
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A domestic monetary expansion will have a posi-
tive inflation ·effect and a non-negative output
effect. Domestic inflation is offset by proportional
exchange rate depreciation. An interesting result
here is that the closer the wage-price elasticity ( 0)
is to unity, the higher will be the inflation-depre-
ciation effect and the lower will be the real output
effect. In the limiting case where, 0 = 1 the out-
put effect is zero.
A short-run relationship between the change in
output and inflation is derived by combining (12)
and (1 3) to yield:
As long as wages do not completely adjust to
prices (0:,..6< 1) there is a short-run trade-off be-
tween inflation and output growth. The slope of
this trade-off is related positively to y , labor's
share in output.
Simultaneous Domestic and World Monetary
Expansion
Now consider a simultaneous monetary expan-
sion at both the domestic and world level. If
Equations (7) and (8) indicate that domestic
equilibrium price and output depend on domestic
demand management policy, measured by nominal
money growth, and also on nominal wage move-
ments. The former causes a shift in the aggregate
demand curve and the latter a shift in the aggre-
gate supply curve.
We go on to consider the cases of first a simple
domestic monetary expansion, and then a simul-
taneous domestic and world monetary expansion.
Domestic and world money supplies have been
assumed to be independent of each other.
17e=_l_(m_mw ) <0 (19)
l+y 0·
Domestic inflation is higher and domestic output
expansion is lower than in the case of a simple
monetary expansion, or in the case where m w .5- om.
The exchange rate will unambiguously appreciate.
If the wage-price elasticity (6 ) is sufficiently close
to unity, the output effect will be negative.
APPENDIX II
Evidence from Other Countries: The Case of the
U.K. and Germany
The model developed above suggests that the
impact of international inflation on the domestic
price level depends upon. ( I) the share of inter-
nationally traded goods in the domestic price index
and (2) the responsiveness of domestic wages to
domestic prices. Both influences work to increase




In the body of this article the response of wages
to prices was estimated using U.S. data. The results
suggest that over a period of 3 years every I-percent
increase in consumer prices leads to a .9-percent
increase in wages. Sixty percent of the wage in-
crease occurs in the first year. Similar equations
are estimated for the U.K. and Germany. Nominal
wages are determined primarily by the growth in
lab'(;r productivity and the rise in consumer prices.
If productivity grows at a relatively constant rate,
then an equation estimating changes in wages in
response to changes in prices would as a first-order
approximation give information on both sets of
determinants. The constant term would show the
growth in wages with respect to productivity, and
the coefficient on the price variable would show the
growth in nominal wages with respect to the rate
ofinflation.
On the basis of postwar economic history, one
would expect that the coefficient relating wages to
prices to be larger in the case of the U.K. than in
the case of Germany. In the U.K. the strong labor-
union movement has exercised its power system-
atically to protect the real wages of its members
from the effects of inflation." In Germany, on the
other hand, the labor unions have been less militant.
While German wages have risen faster than Ger-
man prices in the last J5 years, labor unions appar-
ently have not tried to use their power to vary
wages substantially in response to inflation. The
estimated equations for the U.K. and Germany are
given below.~'











These equations are estimated over the period
1960.2 to 1976.3. In the case of the U.K., it takes
two quarters for the full effects of a rise in the
domestic price level to be transmitted to nominal
wages. When longer lags are estimated, the co-
efficient rises above unity. The minimum standard
error for this equation is achieved with a lag of
eight quarters and a coefficient value of 1.39. This
implies that money wages in the u.K. respond on
average by more than the rate of inflation! For
Germany the coefficient relating domestic inflation
to domestic wage rates was insignificant for all
lagged periods investigated. The result presented
was the lagged pattern (t-8) with the minimum
standard error.
These results suggest that international inflation
is almost completely transmitted to U.K. prices,
but that it has a much smaller impact on German
domestic prices. We can confirm this conjecture
directly by estimating domestic price equations for
both countries.
U.K.
6109 CPI = 3.1 + Z0.15 6109 M t _8 + .61 6109 PW
t





6109 CPI -1.0 + Z·38 6109 M t-12 + Z.15 6109 PW
t
_
4 (0.6) (2.4) (3.6)
R2/SE .38/2.44
O,J/OE 1.61/42
The equation for each country is identical to
the specification in the test for the U.S. inflation
rate. For the u.K. the international inflation
variable has a large and significant coefficient. For
every l-percent increase in international inflation
(measured in a dollar-denominated index) over
the previous four quarters, U.K. CPI inflation will
increase .61 percent. In the German case a I-per-cent increase in international prices leads to a .15
percent increase in domestic prices. Germany is
almost as open an economy as the u.K. but its
world inflation coefficient is much lower (.15
versus .61). A rough measure of the share of in-
ternational goods in a country is the share of ex-
ports plus imports to GNP. For 1975 the share for
Germany was 54 percent, and for the u.K. 56
percent.
These results are consistent with the wage equa-
tions presented above. Since German wages are less
sensitive to domestic inflation than U.K. wages, a
such smaller proportion of the international infla-
tion will "stick" in Germany.
APPENDIX FOOTNOTES
1. A third influence is the speed of response of real income
to changes in real money balances. Earlier work by one
of the authors suggests that such response is relatively
uniform across countries in the range of one to one and a
half years. M. W. Keran, "Selecting a Monetary Indica-
tor," Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, September 1970
(Reprint No. 59).
2. Sir John Hicks, "What's Wrong with Monetarism,"
Llovds Bank Review, October 1975.
3. P is the consumer price index for both countries. W is
an index of average monthly wages for the U.K. and an
index of hourly earnings for Germany. International
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics (com-
puter tape).
4. This is explained partially by institutional factors. Dur-
ing 1973-74 the combination of domestic price control and
threshold wage agreements in a world inflationary situa-
tion caused real wages to rise on trend. For a fuller
explanation, see Marcus H. Muller, "Can a Rise in Im-
port Prices be Inflationary and Deflationary? Economists
and the U.K. Inflation, 1973-74" American Economic
Review, September 1976.
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